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Forsey 1
TOWARDS A WORKABLE RUBRIC FOR ASSESSING PHOTOSHOP LIABILITY
By: Logan Forsey
Part I: Introduction
As technology has developed over the past decade and items such as Adobe Photoshop
have made photo editing as simple as the click of a button, images in news publications, beauty
magazines, and even on social networks are being altered in both subtle and dramatic ways. In
today’s media, images have been altered more often than not.1 More recently, these images have
been altered using “retouching software that can make celebrities and models look thinner, taller,
unblemished, with brighter eyes and whiter teeth.”2 No longer are photographers simply playing
tricks with the lighting or exposure in order to create a different effect than what is shown
through the pose.3 Now, digital photography has made it easy to manipulate photographs.4
Unfortunately, however, these digital innovations can have untoward effects. On the one hand,
they can make a model appear “seemingly perfect.”5 On the other hand, they can manipulate the
photographs so that the “cover models often resemble weirdly synthesized creatures or . . .
‘objects from Mars.’”6 As such, the alterations can be subtle ones that make the model appear
five or ten pounds thinner, or they can be drastic distortions that are meant as a satire of the
subject in the photograph.
A significant effect of these digital alterations is that young, impressionable girls are
fooled into believing that the retouched model or celebrity on the cover of the latest fashion
magazine truly is as thin and blemish-free as she appears. As a result, these young girls become
Eric Wilson, Smile and Say ‘No Photoshop’, N.Y. TIMES, May 27, 2009,
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/05/28/fashion/28RETOUCH.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0.
2
Id.
3
Id.
4
Id.
5
Id.
6
Id.
1
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accustomed to seeing these photographs broadcast throughout media outlets and come to believe
that the images portray “real” beauty, a beauty they wish to attain themselves.7 Unfortunately,
these young consumers do not realize that the beauty they are striving for is not natural or the
product of a healthy diet, but rather it is the result of digital enhancement and is “not achievable
by a real girl.”8 In essence, photoshopping images of female models “creates unattainable images
for most American women.”9 Furthermore, evidence has confirmed that women, on average,
“have lower self-concept immediately after viewing an image of a thin model over other kinds of
images.”10 “Consumers, particularly young female adults viewing fashion advertisements, do not
know that the images are computer altered, and therefore, try to replicate figures that are nearly
impossible to attain.”11 When these young women strive to replicate the manipulated bodies of
fashion magazine models, they tend to “develop unsafe eating habits.”12 Studies show that only a
year’s subscription to a fashion magazine can lead to “increased body dissatisfaction, dieting,
and bulimic symptoms amongst adolescent girls.”13 Photoshopping in these fashion magazines
presents “concerns similar to those surrounding tobacco and fast-food advertisements.”14 It is
peculiar, then, that the government has sought to regulate advertisements for tobacco and fastfood companies, but has remained virtually silent regarding photoshopped images.15
Along with the harm that photoshopped images can cause to young women, these images
can also be injurious to their subjects. Often these subjects are celebrities who find a digitally
7

Nicole Hunter, Beauty Is in the Eye of the Retoucher: Why Photoshopped Magazine Images Require Regulation,
33 WOMEN’S RTS. L. REP. 82, 93 (2011).
8
Id.
9
Id.
10
Id. at 95.
11
Id. at 100. “These young consumers are more likely to submit to peer pressure and incorporate the values and
images they view into their developing self-identifies. Advertising has been said to be one of the most potent
messengers in a culture that can be toxic for a girls’ self-esteem.” Id. at 102.
12
Id.
13
Hunter, supra note 7, at 95.
14
Id.
15
Id. at 97.
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altered photograph of themselves to be offensive or unflattering. Over the past few years,
“several popular fashion publications have found themselves caught in a whirlwind of negative
publicity based on photoshopping allegations.”16 For example, Kate Winslet took action against
GQ magazine for “digitally altering her body in its photographs—making her unrealistically
thin.”17 Well-known celebrities such as Demi Moore and Brad Pitt have also voiced their
concerns over photoshopping and directed their attention to the popular fashion magazine W.
Prior to his photo shoot for the W magazine cover, Brad Pitt requested that there be no
retouching and even selected his own photographer, one who he knew would “expose skin
flaws.”18
Regardless of which publication contains the image, it is a harsh reality that there is no
standard precisely on point that can be used to determine the liability that should be attributed to
the creator of such photoshopped images that offend or misrepresent their subject.19 Two
potential explanations for why a standard has not yet been established are: (1) photoshopped
images may be protected in some contexts as a form of commercial speech; and (2) the
marketplace of ideas theory. The first possible explanation will not be explored in any great
depth in this Note, but it is important to briefly mention it nonetheless. Scholars have argued this
commercial speech theory in the context of photoshopped advertisements and determined that

16

Id. at 85. It is important to note that fashion magazines are not the only publications that receive negative publicity
for the use of Photoshop. Newsweek, an American news magazine, has “manipulated images appearing in its
magazine, even though it claims to have a policy against the practice. In March 2005, Martha Stewart appeared on
Newsweek’s cover accompanied by the headline ‘After Prison She’s Thinner, Wealthier & Ready for Primetime.’
Stewart did appear thinner on the cover, but not because she lost weight; rather her head was removed and placed on
a model’s body in the published image.” Id. at 104-105.
17
Vivian Diller, Ph.D., Is Photoshop Destroying America’s Body Image?, HUFFINGTON POST, July 7, 2011,
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/vivian-diller-phd/photoshop-body-image_b_891095.html.
18
Id.
19
“Currently there are no laws regulating the manipulation of images in magazines. The danger and concern is that
‘in the digital era, images can be manipulated any way its creator desires. Slimmer. Taller. Change skin colour.
Swap body parts. Nothing is impossible and nothing is illegal.’” Hunter, supra note 7, at 83.
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such images can either be regulated as “deceptive or misleading advertising”20 or under the
Central Hudson analysis.21 Photoshopped advertisements have the potential to be misleading
when “consumers are unable to distinguish a real image from a manipulated one and . . .
consumers are considering these computer-altered models as a factor when making purchase
decisions.”22 Once deemed misleading, these images would no longer receive First Amendment
protection and a government agency could impose a “reasonable regulation to prevent consumer
harm.”23 On the other hand, if the images are not deemed misleading, any regulation passed to
police them would need to meet the Central Hudson test, which requires that the regulation be
“narrowly tailored enough to balance the First Amendment concerns with the need for
intervention.”24
This Note explores not only photoshopped images in advertisements or fashion
magazines but also photoshopped images with varying degrees of manipulation. For these
images, the lack of liability can likely be explained not with commercial speech principles, but
rather with another significant First Amendment principle: the “marketplace of ideas” theory.
The marketplace of ideas theory was first advocated by John Stuart Mill and can be defined as “a
forum in which expressions of opinion can freely compete for acceptance without governmental
restraint.”25 Although courts and scholars generally acknowledge that there can be a real societal
harm when bad information is released to the public, their belief “in an efficient marketplace of
ideas [leads] them to conclude that high-quality information [will] eventually beat out low-

20

Hunter, supra note 7, at 89.
Id. at 96-97. In Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public Service Commission of New York, the Supreme
Court “articulated a four-part test that commercial speech regulation must pass in order to be deemed
constitutional.” Id. at 88.
22
Id. at 111.
23
Id.
24
Id. at 103.
25
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (9th ed. 2009).
21
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quality information.”26 It is likely that the lack of photoshop liability can be attributed to many
scholars believing in the ability of positive imagery to outweigh the negative effects of
significantly manipulated images.
Unfortunately, the marketplace of ideas has not been successful in balancing unedited,
natural photographs of celebrities and models with the highly manipulated and often offensive
photoshopped images of these same subjects. This is because the marketplace of ideas theory is
“based on assumptions that have been proven untenable,” as consumers are no longer searching
for the truth, but rather “for information that confirms their own pre-existing biases.”27 Even
when confronted with the truth, unbiased information consumers still have a tendency to believe
the lie.28 This problem is increased by the ready availability of dissemination in an internet era,
which has “dramatically increased the quantity of low quality information,” and the “relative
permanence of amateur digital media, which can increase the lifespan of low-quality
information.”29 Both of these problems contribute to the “problem of information pollution, the
high proportion of low-quality to high-quality information increasingly forcing information
consumers to expend extra resources to sift through the rubbish, a growing harm that the United
States Supreme Court has yet to recognize in its First Amendment jurisprudence.”30
This Note will argue that photoshopped images have distorted the marketplace of ideas to
such a point that government and the courts must come up with a workable standard to determine
photoshop liability. Without the marketplace of ideas to fetter out the low-quality information
from the high-quality information, the subjects of these photoshopped images are being harmed
and currently have no legal redress against the creators of such images. Part II of this Note will
26

Jamie Lund, Correcting Digital Speech, 19 UCLA ENT. L. REV. 170, 171 (2012).
Id.
28
Id.
29
Id.
30
Id.
27
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examine three potential analogies that could help to create a standard for photoshop liability: (1)
cartoon parodies; (2) the tort of false light; and (2) the invasion of privacy when the subject is a
public figure. Furthermore, Part II will assess the propriety of state legislative efforts at reform.
Part III will describe alternative grounds for liability and propose a workable rubric for
photoshop liability. Finally, Part IV will conclude that the solution proposed in this Note must be
implemented so that First Amendment jurisprudence can keep up with the changing world of
digital technology.
Part II Analogous Templates for Imposition of Liability
The Supreme Court has yet to establish a standard that judges can use to assess the
liability of authors31 who use photoshopped images in their publications. When faced with the
task of creating a standard of liability for an undeveloped area of the law, often liability can be
assessed by making an analogy between the undeveloped area and an area where a standard has
already been articulated. Therefore, one must look to appropriate analogies across a variety of
different First Amendment areas in order to find a workable standard for photoshop liability.
A. Analogy to Cartoon Parodies: Hustler Magazine v. Falwell
The first, and arguably closest, analogy to photoshopping is the use of a parody, generally
in the form of a cartoon, of a subject. This cartoon parody first became known to the legal
community after the Supreme Court handed down its decision in Hustler Magazine v. Falwell32
in 1988.
a. Hustler’s Holding
In Hustler v. Falwell, Jerry Falwell, a nationally known minister and commentator on
public affairs, “sued publishers of advertisement parody for libel, invasion of privacy, and
This Note will use “creator” and “author” interchangeably to describe an individual who digitally alters a
photoshop through digitial enhancement software such as Adobe Phothoshop.
32
485 U.S. 46 (1988).
31
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intentional infliction of emotional distress.”33 The suit arose after Hustler Magazine, Inc., a
magazine of nationwide circulation, published its November 1983 issue.34 The inside front cover
of this issue “feature[d] a ‘parody’ of an advertisement for Campari Liqueur that contained the
name and picture of [Mr. Falwell] and was entitled ‘Jerry Falwell talks about his first time.’”35
This parody was actually modeled after real ads for Campari Liqueur that included “interviews
with various celebrities about their ‘first times.’”36 “Although it was apparent by the end of each
interview that this meant the first time they sampled Campari, the ads clearly played on the
sexual double entendre of the general subject of ‘first times.’”37
Hustler’s editors copied the form and layout of the Campari “first time” ads. 38 They
chose Mr. Falwell as the “featured celebrity and drafted an alleged ‘interview’ with him in which
he states that his ‘first time’ was during a drunken incestuous rendezvous with his mother in an
outhouse.”39 The Hustler parody portrayed Mr. Falwell and his mother as “drunk and immoral”
and suggested that Mr. Falwell was a “hypocrite who preaches only when he is drunk.”40 In fine
print at the bottom of the page, the ad contained the following disclaimer: “ad parody—not to be
taken seriously.”41 Soon after this particular issue of Hustler magazine became available to the
public, Mr. Falwell brought a complaint against Hustler Magazine, Inc., alleging that
“publication of the ad parody in Hustler entitled him to recover damages for libel, invasion of
privacy, and intentional infliction of emotional distress.”42 The jury found against Mr. Falwell on
the libel claim, “specifically finding that the parody could not ‘reasonably be understood as
33

Id. at 46.
Id. at 47-48.
35
Id. at 48.
36
Id.
37
Id.
38
Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 48 (1988).
39
Id.
40
Id.
41
Id.
42
Id. at 47-48.
34
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describing actual facts . . . or events,’ but ruled in his favor on the emotional distress claim,
stating that he should be awarded compensatory and punitive damages.”43 The Court of Appeals
affirmed this ruling.44
In 1987, the Supreme Court granted certiorari in an effort to resolve the important
constitutional issues discussed in the Falwell case.45 The issue in the case before the Supreme
Court was whether a “public figure may recover damages for emotional harm caused by the
publication of an ad parody offensive to him, and doubtless gross and repugnant in the eyes of
most.”46 “Rejecting as irrelevant the contention that, because the jury found that the parody did
not describe actual facts, the ad was an opinion protected by the First Amendment to the Federal
Constitution, the [C]ourt ruled that the issue was whether the ad's publication was sufficiently
outrageous to constitute intentional infliction of emotional distress.”47
In an effort to “protect the free flow of ideas and opinions on matters of public interest
and concern,”48 the Court first held that public figures and public officials “may not recover for
the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress by reason of publications such as the one . .
. at issue without showing in addition that the publication contains a false statement of fact which
was made with ‘actual malice.’”49 This “actual malice” standard comes from the Court’s
landmark 1964 case, New York Times v. Sullivan.50 In New York Times, the Court held that “in a
libel suit brought by a public official, the [F]irst [A]mendment requires the plaintiff to
demonstrate with clear and convincing evidence that the defendant published the statement with
‘actual malice,’ that is, ‘with knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard of whether it
43

Id. at 49.
Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 49 (1988).
45
Id. at 50.
46
Id.
47
Id. at 46.
48
Id.
49
Id. at 56.
50
376 U.S. 254 (1964).
44
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was false or not.’”51 For purposes of the actual malice standard and First Amendment law in
general, the Hustler Court found that Mr. Falwell was a “public figure” and therefore subject to
this actual malice standard.52
Furthermore, the Court found that the State’s interest “in protecting public figures from
emotional distress is not sufficient to deny First Amendment protection to speech that is patently
offensive and is intended to inflict emotional injury when that speech could not reasonably have
been interpreted as stating actual facts about the public figure involved.”53 The Court looked to
and accepted the lower court’s determination that the cartoon parody could not “reasonably be
understood as describing actual facts about [Mr. Falwell] or actual events in which [he]
participated.”54 Furthermore, the Supreme Court accepted the determination of the Court of
Appeals that the cartoon parody was not “reasonably believable.”55 Thus, the Supreme Court
reaffirmed that “protection of statements of ‘opinion’ may be compelled by the First
Amendment.”56 More specifically, the Court “extended First Amendment protection to speech
that ‘could not reasonably have been interpreted as stating actual facts about the public figure
involved,’ even if that speech were ‘patently offensive and . . . intended to inflict emotional
injury.’”57
After concluding that the cartoon parody could not reasonably have been interpreted as
stating actual facts about Mr. Falwell, the Court was left to consider whether “outrageousness”

51

Rodney A. Smolla, Emotional Distress and the First Amendment: An Analysis of Hustler v. Falwell, 20 ARIZ. ST.
L.J. 423, 426-427 (1988) (quoting New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279-280 (1964)). The Hustler Court
felt that this actual malice standard reflected its “considered judgment that such a standard is necessary to give
adequate “breathing space” to the freedoms protected by the First Amendment. Hustler, 485 U.S. at 56.
52
Hustler, 485 U.S. at 57.
53
Id. at 46.
54
Id.
55
Id.
56
Joseph H. King, Defamation Claims Based on Parody and Other Fanciful Communications Not Intended to be
Understood as Fact, 2008 UTAH L. REV. 875, 890 (2008).
57
Id.
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should be the standard used when evaluating cartoon parodies.58 Mr. Falwell unsuccessfully
argued that the cartoon parody was so “outrageous” as to “distinguish it from more traditional
political cartoons” and thus remove it from First Amendment protection.59 The Court rejected
this “outrageousness” argument, finding that such a standard would be too subjective and would
give the jury discretion to impose liability on the basis of his or her tastes or views, “or perhaps
on the basis of [his or her] dislike of a particular expression.”60 According to the justices, an
“outrageousness” standard would run afoul of the Court’s “longstanding refusal to allow
damages to be awarded because the speech in question may have an adverse emotional impact on
the audience.”61
In delivering the opinion for the Hustler Court, Chief Justice William Rehnquist stated
that “public figures and public officials may not recover for the tort of intentional infliction of
emotional distress by reason of publications such as the one here at issue without showing in
addition that the publication contains a false statement of fact which was made with ‘actual
malice,’ i.e., with knowledge that the statement was false or with reckless disregard as to
whether it was true.”62 Chief Justice Rehnquist further concluded that the jury in the lower court
had “explicitly found that the statement as not factual” and in the absence of a misstatement of
fact, Mr. Falwell “could not . . . recover for the mere intentional infliction of emotional
distress.”63 Following the majority opinion, Justice Byron White filed a “brief, two-sentence,
separate concurring opinion.”64 In his concurrence, Justice White opined: “The decision in New
York Times v. Sullivan . . . has little to do with this case, for here the jury found that the ad
58

Hustler, 485 U.S. at 57.
Id. at 55.
60
Id.
61
Id.
62
Smolla, supra note 51, at 437.
63
Id.
64
Id.
59
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contained no assertion of fact. But I agree with the Court that the judgment below, which
penalized publication of the parody, cannot be squared with the First Amendment.”65
In addition to applying the New York Times standard to cartoon parodies, the majority
acknowledged both the “fundamental importance of the free flow of ideas and opinions” and the
marketplace of ideas.66 The justices stated that the “freedom to speak one’s mind is not only an
aspect of individual liberty—and thus a good unto itself—but also is essential to the common
quest for truth and the vitality of society as a whole.”67 Furthermore, the Court discussed the
theory of the marketplace ideas in terms of false statements of fact. The justices concluded that
“false statements of fact are particularly valueless; they interfere with the truth-seeking function
of the marketplace of ideas, and they cause damage to an individual’s reputation that cannot
easily be repaired by counterspeech, however persuasive or effective.”68 Although these
falsehoods have little value in and of themselves, however, they are “nevertheless inevitable in
free debate.”69
The Hustler Court is recognizing that falsehoods such as those inherent in cartoon
parodies can have an interference with the marketplace of ideas and thus distort it. Similarly,
images that are severely manipulated through photoshopping could potentially be classified as
“false statements of fact” that interfere with the truth-seeking function of the marketplace of
ideas. Like the effect of cartoon parodies, photoshopped images that greatly alter the original
portrayal of a subject can be damaging to that subject’s reputation. This damaging effect cannot
easily be challenged through counterspeech, as the original photograph rarely makes headlines or

65

Hustler, 485 U.S. at 57.
Id. at 50-52.
67
Id. at 50-51 (quoting Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of Untied States, Inc., 466 U.S. 485, 503-504 (1984)).
68
Id. at 52.
69
Id.
66
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even surfaces in the media. Without counterspeech as a remedy, it appears that photoshopped
images, like cartoon parodies, distort the marketplace of ideas.
b. Political Cartoons
By concluding that Mr. Falwell could not recover under intentional infliction of
emotional distress, the Hustler Court made a “glowing endorsement of free speech” and “made
clear its interest in preserving the ‘free trade of ideas,’ even when the speech is patently
offensive and is intended to inflict emotional distress.”70 The Court expressed its concern “over
the chilling effect on political cartoons if plaintiffs who could not recover for libel were allowed
to recover for emotional distress.”71 The justices felt that if they ruled differently on this issue,
“political cartoonists and satirists would be subjected to damages awards without any showing
that their work falsely defamed its subject.”72 By the end of the Court’s reasoning in Hustler, it
became clear that the justices viewed political cartoons, parodies, and caricatures as part of the
same category and therefore deserving of the same level of protection. The Court presented the
definition of a caricature as “the deliberately distorted picturing or imitating of a person . . .by
exaggerating features or mannerisms for satirical effect,”73 while a parody is a “composition in
which an author’s ‘characteristic turns of thought and phrase . . . are imitated in such a way as to
make them appear ridiculous, especially by applying them to ludicrously inappropriate
subjects.’”74 Political cartoons can take the form of caricatures, parodies, or both, as such
cartoons often imitate a person through exaggerated features that make them appear ridiculous
for a satirical effect.
70

Sandra Davidson Scott, From Satirical to Satyrical: When Is a Joke Actionable?, 13 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT.
L.J. 141, 147 (1991).
71
Id.
72
Hustler, 485 U.S. at 53.
73
Id. at 53-54 (quoting WEBSTER'S NEW UNABRIDGED TWENTIETH CENTURY DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH
LANGUAGE 275 (2d ed. 1979)).
74
Scott, supra note 70, at 177 (quoting OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY (2d ed. 1989)).
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The Court described political cartoons as a type of “weapon of attack, of scorn and
ridicule and satire” and expressed the opinion that such cartoons are least effective when they
“try to pat some politician on the back.”75 Further, “the appeal of the political cartoon or
caricature is often based on exploration of unfortunate physical traits or politically embarrassing
events—an exploration often calculated to injure the feelings of the subject of the portrayal.”76
According to the Court, “graphic depictions and satirical cartoons have played a prominent role
in public and political debate” despite their “sometimes caustic nature.”77 Chief Justice
Rehnquist gave several descriptions of political cartoons throughout the ages, including ones
containing “Lincoln’s tall, gangling posture, Teddy Roosevelt’s glasses and teeth, and Franklin
D. Roosevelt’s jutting jaw and cigarette holder.”78 The Chief Justice reinforced the efforts of
political cartoonists by explaining that the effect of these political cartoons “could not have been
obtained by the photographer or the portrait artist.”79 He concluded his support of such cartoons
by positing that “from the viewpoint of history it is clear that our political discourse would have
been considerably poorer without them.”80
c. Adequacy of Cartoon Parody as Analogy to Photoshopped Images
At first glance it appears that photoshopped images could be analogous to cartoon
parodies or political cartoons. A closer look, however, makes it evident that attempting to
pigeonhole photoshopped images into this category would be quite unsuccessful. Photoshopped
images can come in many different shapes and sizes. For example, a photo of President Barack

75

Hustler, 485 U.S. at 54.
Id.
77
Id.
78
Id. at 55.
79
Id.
80
Id.
76
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Obama skeet shooting at Camp David has been repeatedly photoshopped.81 White House
personnel initially took to the White House Flickr page to warn the public not to alter the
photograph, stating that it was being made available “only for publication by news organizations
and/or for personal use printing by the subject(s) of the photograph” and that it may not “be
manipulated in any way and may not be used in commercial or political materials,
advertisements, emails, products, promotions that in any way suggests approval or endorsement
of the President, the First Family, or the White House.”82 Despite this warning, several versions
of the photograph immediately began circulating the internet via social media. One of the most
popular photoshopped versions of this image posed President Obama as if he were shooting both
the American flag and the Constitution.83 In another version, the President was featured shooting
the gun while wearing a tutu, a crown, and pink fingernails.84
By taking a quick, simple glance at these photos, the American public can easily discern
that the original photograph of President Obama skeet shooting was digitally altered to make him
look ridiculous, feminine, and anti-American. It is highly unlikely that someone who stumbles
upon this image on social media would truly believe that President Obama was shooting the
Constitution or wearing a crown and a tutu while he shot a gun. These digitally altered images
constitute one end of the photoshopping spectrum, as they contain obvious and discernible
distortions.
At the other end of the spectrum are photoshopped images that contain more subtle
distortions. For example, photoshopping in the magazine industry has become more widespread

Mike Opelka, White House Dared People to Photoshop Obama’s Gun Picture…And Did They Ever, THE BLAZE,
Feb. 3, 2013, http://www.theblaze.com/stories/2013/02/03/white-house-dared-people-to-photoshop-obamas-gunpicture-and-did-they-ever/.
82
http://www.flickr.com/photos/whitehouse/8436110735/.
83
Id.
84
Id.
81
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than ever, as “new technological advances that allow images to be manipulated easily, and with
magazines in authoritative positions employing more digital retouchers, image manipulation has
been taken to new heights.”85 Prior to the transformation of digital technology, photo
enhancement was simply used to smooth the complexions of models or move strands of hair that
had fallen out of place.86 Now, however, new digital technology can be used to “[widen] eyes,
[adjust] teeth to create the perfect white smile and, in some cases, . . . [replace] feet, hands and
even legs to create a new image.”87 Such visual distortions create the impression that the model
or celebrity has been blessed with perfect teeth, thin legs, or a flawless complexion. These
distortions, although sometimes dramatic, are as not as obvious to the public. They are not
obvious changes such as inserting a tutu onto the President’s torso, but rather are minor
adjustments that appear as real as the original photograph. Consumers, particularly young female
adults, are tricked into believing that the photoshopped images are real depictions of their
favorite celebrities or fashion icons.88
Looking at these two ends of the spectrum, the political cartoons and parodies explained
in the Hustler case fit easily into the end of the spectrum where the viewer can quickly determine
that the visual is not actually what the subject looks like. When an observer sees a cartoon of a
politician, that observer does not automatically think that the politician looks like a cartoon
character such that he or she has exaggerated characteristics like a big head and a small body.
Instead, the observer quickly understands that the cartoon is the author’s personal depiction of
the subject. The Hustler standard, therefore, could theoretically help to establish liability for
photoshopped images that have obviously been drastically manipulated, such as the image of

85

Hunter, supra note 7, at 85.
Id.
87
Id.
88
Id. at 100.
86
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Obama wearing a crown and a tutu. Unfortunately, many photoshopped images contain only
minor enhancements to the subject’s body and can often fool the unsuspecting observer. If an
author digitally enhances a model’s body so that her legs look only slightly thinner, it is harder
for the consumer to notice such a minor difference. These types of minor enhancements are the
ones that appear most often in the media realm and can have the most negative impact on their
subjects, as the public cannot easily determine that the photo is digitally enhanced and is
therefore tricked into believing that the photograph is a real depiction of the subject.
If one accepts the premise that photoshopped images with minor enhancements are not
equivalent to the drastic distortions of political cartoons and parodies, then one must also
conclude that the Hustler standard is insufficient in the context of minor digital enhancements.
The Hustler standard plainly does not cover minor and subtle changes to the subject of a
photograph and therefore is an inadequate analogy for purposes of determining the author’s
liability.
B. Analogy to False Light Cases
The second analogy that may be helpful in establishing a rubric for assessing photoshop
liability is the tort of “false light.” According to the Restatement (Second) of Torts:
One who gives publicity to a matter concerning another that places the other
before the public in a false light is subject to liability to the other for invasion of
his privacy, if (a) the false light in which the other was placed would be highly
offensive to a reasonable person, and (b) the actor had knowledge of or acted in
reckless disregard as to the falsity of the publicized matter and the false light in
which the other would be placed.89
The tort of false light can be most easily analogized to photoshop liability in cases involving
photographs in publications such as supermarket tabloids90 and Playgirl.91

89

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652 (e) (1977).
Peoples Bank & Trust Co. of Mountain Home v. Globe Int'l Pub., Inc., 978 F.2d 1065 (8th Cir. 1992).
91
Solano v. Playgirl, Inc., 292 F.3d 1078 (9th Cir. 2002).
90
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a. Peoples Bank & Trust Co. of Mountain Home v. Globe Int’l Pub., Inc.
In 1992, the Eighth Circuit decided a case involving the potential liability of Globe
International, Inc. (hereinafter “Globe”) for reusing a photograph of Nellie Mitchell that had
been printed in the National Examiner and placing it next to a headline “about a ‘granny forced
to quit work because of pregnancy” in the supermarket tabloid The Sun.92 Globe was the
publisher of several tabloids, including the National Examiner and The Sun.93 Initially, Globe’s
November 25, 1980 issue of the National Examiner contained an accurate photograph of Ms.
Mitchell with an accompanying story.94 On October 2, 1990, however, The Sun printed the same
photograph of Ms. Mitchell.95 This time, her photograph appeared next to a headline that read
“Pregnancy forces granny to quit work at age 101.”96 The tabloid circulated throughout
supermarkets in the county where Ms. Mitchell lived and worked.97 Customers who stood in the
checkout lines at these supermarkets could easily see Ms. Mitchell on the front cover next to this
“pregnant granny” headline.98 If a customer later picked up or purchased the tabloid, they could
turn to the story on page eleven and see a “second photograph of [Ms.] Mitchell next to a
fictitious story about a woman named ‘Audrey Wiles,’ living in Australia, who quit her paper
route at the age of 101 because an extramarital affair with a millionaire client on her route had
left her pregnant.”99 The October 1990 issue of The Sun was a “sell-out” where Ms. Mitchell
lived and news spread that “Nellie Mitchell, ‘the paper lady,’ was featured in the offending
edition of [The] Sun.”100
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Ms. Mitchell filed suit against Globe, initially only suing for libel.101 After the case was
removed to federal court, Peoples Bank and Trust Company of Mountain Home, as conservator
of Ms. Mitchell’s estate, was substituted as plaintiff and amended the complaint to include
claims of “defamation, false light invasion of privacy, and outrage (intentional infliction of
emotional distress).”102 During the jury trial, the District Court gave the following instruction
regarding false light invasion of privacy: “to prevail on this claim, the plaintiff has the burden of
proving by clear and convincing evidence the following: one, that the false light in which she
was placed by the publicity would be highly offensive to a reasonable person; and two, that the
defendant acted with actual malice in publishing the statements at issue in this case.”103 The
District Court further instructed that actual malice means that Globe “intended, or recklessly
failed to anticipate, that readers would construe the publicized matter as conveying actual facts
or events concerning Mrs. Mitchell” and therefore a finding of actual malice “requires a showing
of more than mere negligence.”104
The jury trial in the District Court returned a unanimous verdict for Ms. Mitchell and
awarded her both compensatory and punitive damages for invasion of privacy and outrage.105
Globe appealed the verdict, arguing that Ms. Mitchell could not “prevail as a matter of law” and
that the evidence did not “support an invasion of privacy claim or the tort of outrage.”106 The
thrust of Globe’s argument was that the assertion of pregnancy could not “reasonably be
believed, and therefore must render the whole story an obvious, non-actionable ‘fiction.’”107 The
Eighth Circuit reasoned that every other aspect of the story, such as the “implication of sexual
101

Id.
Id.
103
Id. at 1068.
104
Peoples Bank & Trust Co. of Mountain Home v. Globe Int'l Pub., Inc., 978 F.2d 1065, 1068 (8th Cir. 1992).
105
Id. at 1067.
106
Id.
107
Id. at 1069.
102

Forsey 19
impropriety and that [Ms.] Mitchell was quitting her life-long profession” were subject to
reasonable belief.108 Even the story about her pregnancy, which is a physical condition and not
an opinion or metaphor, “could be proved either true or false.”109 Based on the foregoing, the
court concluded that it could not say as “as a matter of law that readers could not reasonably
have believed that the charged story portrayed actual facts or events concerning [Ms.]
Mitchell.”110 Furthermore, in affirming the holding of the District Court, the Eighth Circuit held
that its own analysis of the tabloid at issue led it to conclude that Globe did not “intend [The] Sun
to be an obvious work of fiction at all, but rather [held] out the publication as factual and
true.”111 The court ruled that Ms. Mitchell adequately met her burden on the claim of false light
because she had proven that the false light she was portrayed in by the photograph would be
highly offensive to a reasonable person and that Globe had acted with actual malice.
b. Solano v. Playgirl, Inc.
A Ninth Circuit case in 2002 analyzed the tort of false light against Playgirl magazine.112
A tort committed by this type of publication could arguably cause more damage to a subject’s
reputation than a supermarket tabloid, as this magazine often “features sexually suggestive nude
pictures of men.”113 In the January 1999 issue of Playgirl magazine, the cover photograph
featured actor Jose Solano, Jr., best known for his role on the television program “Baywatch.”114
The cover photo showed Solano “shirtless and wearing his red lifeguard trunks, the uniform of

108

Id.
Id.
110
Peoples Bank & Trust Co. of Mountain Home v. Globe Int'l Pub., Inc., 978 F.2d 1065, 1069 (8th Cir. 1992).
111
Id.
112
Solano v. Playgirl, Inc., 292 F.3d 1078 (9th Cir. 2002).
113
Id. at 1082.
114
Id. at 1080.
109

Forsey 20
his ‘Baywatch’ character, under a heading reading: ‘TV Guys. PRIMETIME’S SEXY YOUNG
STARS EXPOSED.’”115 Below is a copy of the January 1999 cover photo:

116

Despite the photograph and headlines on the front cover, Solano did not pose for this magazine
and had never given an interview.117 His sole appearance inside the magazine was on page 21,
where he appeared fully-clothed along with a short profile of his acting career; however, the
Playgirl issues were displayed on newsstands “packaged in plastic wrap to prevent potential
customers from flipping through the pages to view the magazine’s contents.”118 This effectively
prevented consumers who did not wish to purchase the entire publication from seeing anything
other than the suggestive front cover. Playgirl has a reputation for appealing to its female readers
by featuring nude photographs of men “in various poses emphasizing their genitalia, including
some showing them engaged in simulated sex acts,” although the magazine does also contain
115
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some minimum writing in the form of editorials.119 Inevitably, Solano’s photograph on the cover
of this magazine caused him humiliation and embarrassment in his workplace, as consumers who
had only viewed the front cover assumed he posed naked for the issue.120 In his suit in District
Court, he sued Playgirl under the tort of false light, alleging that it had “deliberately created the
false impression that he [posed nude], making it appear he was willing to degrade himself and
endorse such a magazine.”121
Initially, the District Court granted Playgirl summary judgment, finding that Solano had
failed “to establish that Playgirl created a false impression about what readers would actually see
of Solano inside the magazine or in any event that it had acted knowingly or recklessly in doing
so.”122 Solano appealed this decision to the Ninth Circuit.123 In evaluating whether Playgirl
should prevail on summary judgment, the court first determined that in order to prevail on his
false light claim under California law or common law, Solano must show that: “(1) Playgirl
disclosed to one or more persons information about or concerning Solano that was presented as
factual but that was actually false or created a false impression about him; (2) the information
was understood by one or more persons to whom it was disclosed as stating or implying
something highly offensive that would have a tendency to injure Solano’s reputation; (3) by clear
and convincing evidence, Playgirl acted with constitutional malice; and (4) Solano was damaged
by the disclosure.”124
The Ninth Circuit reviewed the grant of summary judgment de novo in order to
“determine, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, whether
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any genuine issues of material fact [existed].”125 The court first analyzed whether Solano met his
burden of establishing a genuine issue as to whether the cover photo created a false impression of
him.126 The court indicated that it is “well-established that ‘[a] defendant is liable for what is
insinuated as well as for what is stated explicitly.’”127 By placing Solano on the cover of a
magazine known for posing men in sexually provocative ways, one could reasonably believe that
Playgirl was making an insinuation about what readers would see inside the magazine.128 In
support of this contention, the court looked to another case involving Hustler, where an actress
“asserted a false light claim based on Hustler magazine’s insinuation that she was the kind of
person to pose nude for Hustler: ‘To be depicted as voluntarily associated with such a sheet . . .
is unquestionably degrading to a normal person…’”129 Therefore, Solano met his burden of
establishing that the cover photo created a false impression of him.
Along with establishing that a false impression was created, Solano, as a public figure,
also had to meet his burden with regard to “actual malice” in order to withstand summary
judgment. To prevail on a claim of false light as a public figure, Solano must establish by clear
and convincing evidence that Playgirl acted with actual malice: that is, the magazine knowingly
or recklessly created the false impression.130. Generally, a plaintiff’s failure “to set forth specific
facts showing such malice is a proper ground for summary judgment.”131 In analyzing the facts
in the light most favorable to Solano, however, the court found that Solano raised a genuine issue
as to “whether Playgirl’s editorial staff produced the January 1999 cover knowing, or with
reckless disregard for whether, Solano’s bare-chested photograph and various suggestive
125
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headlines would falsely imply that he voluntarily posed for and appeared nude inside the
magazine.”132 The court reversed the District Court’s holding and remanded for trial, as it felt
Solano had “provided sufficient evidence to create triable issues of fact for the jury on the
elements of each of his causes of action.”133
c. False Light as Analogy to Photoshopped Images
The branch of privacy law that Ms. Mitchell and actor Jose Solano, Jr. sued under
involves the right of an individual to be free from publicity which places him or her in a false
light in the public eye.134 As stated previously, the Restatement (Second) of Torts provides that
the two main common law elements of false light are that the false light would be highly
offensive to a reasonable person and the author had knowledge of or acted in reckless disregard
as to the falsity of the publicized matter.135
In order to make an analogy between false light publications and photoshopped images,
we must again look at the spectrum of photoshop. On one end of the spectrum, the one with
digitally altered photographs of President Obama wearing a tutu, this obvious distortion of the
President’s features would be an extreme example of portraying a subject in a false light. The
false light portrayed in such photographs could potentially be offensive to the reasonable person,
and the authors generally acted with knowledge of or reckless disregard as to the photograph’s
falsity.
On the other end of the spectrum, a photoshopped image could be one like the NatureLux
Mousse mascara ad that CoverGirl ran featuring pop singer Taylor Swift.136 In the ad, digital
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enhancements to the photograph made Swift’s eyelashes look longer than they actually are.137
Following a complaint from the National Advertising Division (“NAD”) of the Council of Better
Business Bureaus , CoverGirl was forced to pull the ad.138 According to a watchdog group,
“Swift’s eyelashes were enhanced in post-production so much that the ad became misleading.”139
Furthermore, NAD questioned whether the ad “implied that the fullness of Swift’s lashes, which
were enhanced digitally, could really be achieved with the product.”140 Following the removal of
this ad, CoverGirl also “discontinued its claim that the product made users’ lashes two times
fuller than bare lashes and was 20 percent lighter than other mascara.” At this end of the
spectrum, with enhancements that add fullness to a model’s eyelashes, it is difficult to make the
case that a subject such as Taylor Swift could challenge the enhancements under the tort of false
light. Although it may be possible to achieve the actual malice standard if the publisher knew
they were making such blatant changes, it would nevertheless be difficult for the subject to prove
the second element of the tort: that the false light would be highly offensive to a reasonable
person. Furthermore, it might be difficult for Taylor Swift to measure the damage to her
reputation for being portraying with unnaturally long eyelashes. CoverGirl’s use of photoshop is
not easily analogized with the magazine covers in Peoples Bank and Solano.
Based on the foregoing, it appears that the tort of false light invasion of privacy is still an
inadequate analogy when one is attempting to develop a standard for liability based on
photoshop enhancement. False light is best used when a photograph is used to make a celebrity
appear as if he is posing nude inside of a magazine or an older woman has quit her job due to
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pregnancy. These are manipulations to photographs which could potentially offend and humiliate
the reasonable person. The tort of false light does not, however, get to the type of invasion of
privacy where the photograph is not actually a “false light,” but is rather a minimal alteration that
could still cause harm to the subject. Because false light does not cover the most common way
we see photoshopped images being used, it is not a sufficient enough analogy when establishing
a rubric for photoshop liability.
C. Invasion of Privacy: Public v. Private Figures
A third analogy that could potentially help government and the courts develop a workable
standard for photoshop liability comes from the landmark U.S. Supreme Court decision New
York Times Co. v. Sullivan.141 This case involved a full page advertisement in the New York
Times newspaper, which alleged that “Martin Luther King Jr.’s arrest for perjury was part of a
campaign to hinder King’s efforts to ‘integrate public facilities and encourage blacks to vote.’”142
The city commissioner of Montgomery, Alabama, L.B. Sullivan, filed a lawsuit and initially won
a judgment under Alabama law.143 When the case went to the Supreme Court, however, the
justices held that the Alabama law failed to provide adequate safeguards for the First
Amendment right to freedom of speech and press.144 This meant that Commissioner Sullivan was
prohibited from recovering as a public official “unless the public official proved the statement
was made with actual malice.”145
By setting the New York Times v. Sullivan standard, the Court was attempting to establish
a threshold which plaintiffs, as public officials, must meet in order to successfully sue “news
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reporting establishments” for defamation.146 The Court was not intending to give special rights to
the news media, but instead wanted to set a high standard for recovery when the plaintiff is
already in the public spotlight. Later, in Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., the court extended the New
York Times standard to include public figures and defined a “public figure” as an individual who
achieves general fame or notoriety in the community.147 In Gertz, an article was published about
an attorney who had defended a child’s family in a civil action after a police officer killed the
child.148 The article labeled the attorney as a “Leninist” and a “Communist-fronter.”149 After the
attorney filed a libel suit against the reporter, the Court held that the attorney was not a public
figure, as he plainly did not “thrust himself into the vortex of this public issue,” and he therefore
did not have to prove that the article was written with actual malice in order to establish the
reporter’s liability.150 The Gertz decision placed the same high burden for recovery on public
figures as New York Times v. Sullivan had placed on public officials.151
New York Times v. Sullivan and Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc. both involved libel cases in
the printed media152, but their common ideal of applying a heightened standard when media
outlets are sued by a public figure can be seen in the area of photoshop as well. For example,
actor Jake Gyllenhaal claimed in May 2011 that a photograph that had swept across the internet
was a violation of his privacy rights.153 The image attempted to show the actor stretching in his
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“tighty-whitey underwear,” but was actually only Gyllenhaal’s face on another man’s body.154 In
the photo, Gyllenhaal was posed in an attempt to resemble “an album cover pose of singer Grace
Jones.”155 Gyllenhaal’s lawyers at the Los Angeles firm Bloom Hergott claimed that “‘as anyone
could tell from a cursory examination, this is a fake picture, in which our client’s head has been
pasted on the body of another person.’”156 They alleged, however, that the photo “violate[d] the
actor’s legal rights by ‘portraying him in a false light [and] violating his right of publicity.”157
Gyllenhaal has so far been unsuccessful in litigating this claim, as some viewers do not even
believe the image is fake.158 In addition, it would be hard for him to make a defamation claim
and prove that the image truly damages his reputation.
Demi Moore found herself in the exact opposite situation in 2010 when she landed on the
cover of the December Issue of W magazine, seen below:
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In this photograph, it appears that Moore is “impossibly thin,” as there seems to be a “chunk
missing from her left hip where you’d expect a more contiguous line would connect hip to thigh
beneath that pelvic drapery.”160 A spokesperson with the magazine claimed that the publishers
“did not do anything unusual or out of the ordinary on Demi Moore for the photo on the cover of
[W]. Demi is an extraordinary, beautiful woman and we feel our cover reflects that.”161
Furthermore, Moore also denied that she fell “victim to a botched Photoshop job.”162 She took to
Twitter with an “original image” that matches the cover page photo and stated: “Here is the
original image people my hips were not touched don’t let these people bullshit you!”163 Later,
she told reporters that what bothered her about the controversy “wasn’t that people were saying it
was retouched, it was that they were saying [her] hip was so badly botched because a hunk of it
was taken out.”164 She admitted to calling the photographers, who reassured her that they did not
photoshop anything on her hip, thigh, or waist.165 Although she knew that the image had not
been photoshopped, Moore “tasked attorney Marty Singer to tame a blogger who had the nerve
to suggest that a little Photoshopping on December’s W cover made her look like ‘she had some
sort of weird car accident that left a wedge of meat missing.’”166
By reviewing the struggles that these two celebrities have had with their likeness being
photoshopped (or images that appear to be photoshopped even if they have not been), it is clear
that a workable standard must be established to determine photoshop liability. Unfortunately,
however, celebrities do not appear to be having much success bringing libel claims against the
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authors of such photoshopped images, as they know they would have a difficult time meeting the
New York Times actual malice standard. At the time that the Supreme Court introduced this
heightened standard in the 1960s, it was meant for defamation that appeared in words in
newspapers. Technology has drastically changed over the past fifty years and content that could
potentially be defamatory now appears in photographs rather than in printed words. In addition,
the public is now given much more access to news coverage and therefore there is a greater
potential that these photoshopped images are reaching a wider audience and causing more
damage to the subject’s reputation. Due to these immense changes, the Supreme Court needs to
revisited the heightened New York Times actual malice standard to determine whether it should
be applied not only to defamation through the printed word, but also defamation through
photoshopped images.
D. Georgia’s Legislative Response
The final analogy that can be used to establish a rubric for photoshop liability is not based
on caselaw or torts, but rather is based on a legislative response to the changing world of digital
enhancements. Initially, a bill by Georgia state legislators that would criminalize lewd image
alterations was introduced “in response to a teenage girl falling victim to obscene photoshopping.”167 The legislation is House Bill 39 and was originally proposed one year ago by
Representative Earnest Smith.168 The bill died without advancing, but once Representative Smith
and co-sponsor Pam Dickerson were “targeted by online pranksters,” they decided to re-file the
bill.169 If this current bill is passed, the state “could fine creators of offensive images $1,000
167
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and/or impose a 12-month jail sentence for ‘defamation when he or she causes an unknowing
person wrongfully to be identified as the person in an obscene depiction.’”170
The lewd image of Representative Smith that prompted his renewed efforts to get HB 39
passed featured his head “digitally imposed on a nude man’s body.”171 This photoshopped image
was created by a blogger “who used the image to mock Smith.”172 The blogger, Andre Walker,
publicly responded to Smith’s legislative move by stating: “I would simply remind
Representative Smith that he’s a public figure, and just like someone had the protected right to
depict former President George W. Bush as a monkey, I have the protected right to Photoshop
the head of any elected official onto the body of anything I chose.”173 He went on to dispute the
bill on First Amendment grounds, arguing:
‘The First Amendment . . . protects all forms of speech, not just [the] spoken
word. That’s why House Bill 39 is so asinine. It attempts to regulate speech and I
doubt it would stand up in a court of law. Rep. Smith needs to grow some thick
skin if he’s going to be an elected official. Trust me when I say the altered
photograph shown above was not the worst I could have done.’174
In addition, internet bloggers, First Amendment advocates, and even Representative
Smith’s hometown have all chastised his move against satire.175 For example, Tom
Knighton of the Libertarian Party of George explained that what Representative Smith is
seeking to do “is criminalize speech that does nothing more than criticize those in
power.” Furthermore, an editor for the Augusta Chronicle published the statement: “It’s
mind-boggling to think that people who help write our laws are that out to lunch.
Americans have a fundamental right to mock others. It’s an integral part of free speech;
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ridicule and satire simply cannot be boiled out and separated from free speech. It’s
impossible.”176
In response to the overwhelming criticism of his bill, Representative Smith has
retorted: “Everyone has a right to privacy. You have a right to speak, but no one has a
right to disparage another person. It’s not a First Amendment right. It’s clear that we need
to do something. It can be done by anyone at any time.”177 When asked to provide
specifics about the legislation, however, Representative Smith could not provide any.
Instead, he said, “At this juncture, I am not at liberty to share anything with you. I don’t
have to. If and when this bill passes we can revisit the issue and if I choose to give you
details at that time I will, but until then I don’t have to tell you anything.”178
Despite the predictable criticism that the bill has received from internet bloggers
and First Amendment advocates, this bill could provide a workable response to the issue
of how Photoshop liability should be evaluated. Representative Smith advocates the bill
as a way to protect teens from “becoming victims of cyber cruelty.”179 Although critics
believe the bill attacks free speech rights, Representative Smith says it is not about adults,
but is instead about the “sanctity and privacy of our kids.”180 The teenager who was the
inspiration for the original bill did not just have her photograph altered- she had sexual
predators calling her and emailing her as a result of the image being spread on the
internet.181 With no laws on the books to help protect children from this type of
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cyberbullying,182 the legislators are attempting to ensure that victims of obscene
photoshopped images have a potential cause of action against the creators of such images.
As stated previously, Georgia’s legislation would make it a misdemeanor offense (a
crime punishable by up to a $1,000 fine) to alter a photograph “that causes an unknowing person
wrongfully to be identified as the person in an obscene depiction.”183 Although the specifics of
the legislation have not been released, one could imagine that the standard is fairly easy to
implement. For example, the state could use the obscenity standard from Miller v. California184
to determine whether the photoshopped image was obscene. Miller is the Supreme Court’s test to
determine whether speech or an expression is obscene and therefore not protected by the First
Amendment. In order to be labeled “obscene,” the work must meet all three prongs of the Miller
test: (1) the work must appeal to the “prurient interest in sex;” (2) the work must “portray sexual
conduct in a patently offensive way;” and (3) the work must, taken as a whole, have no “serious
literary, artistic, or scientific value.”185 Using this standard, a person could be found liable for
creating an obscene image through the use of Photoshop that causes an unknowing person
wrongfully to be identified as the person in such a photograph.
On the other hand, a standard similar to Georgia’s legislative response would only
address photoshopped images that are obscene and would not address when an image is slightly
altered and still considered offensive to the subject. For example, the digital alterations of Jake
Gyllenhaal or Demi Moore would not fit under the court’s definition of obscene and therefore
the creators of such photographs would not be subject to the $1,000 for their creation. This
standard would only be applicable when the photograph is offensive and lacks no particular
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value in the scientific or literary world. It would not, however, be applicable to the subtle
alterations that we often see in magazines.
Part III: Toward a Workable Response
Each of the four analogies explained above has the potential to be a significant
contributor towards a workable rubric for establishing photoshop liability. On their own,
however, these four templates cannot be used in their precise form. Instead, parts of their
standards and the reasoning behind their implementation must be used in order to create a
workable Photoshop standard. First, liability under Hustler v. Falwell could potentially be used
when there is such a drastic distortion to a photograph that no reasonable viewer could believe in
its truth. Second, under the tort of “false light,” the subject of a photoshopped image could try to
argue that an altered photograph is highly offensive to the reasonable person and the author knew
that the altered image was false. Third, the “actual malice” standard that is applicable to public
figures under New York Times v. Sullivan could be modified to keep pace with changing
technology. Finally, we could turn from the courts to the government and attempt to create a bill
which would make the creator of an obscene photoshopped image subject to a $1,000 fine.
Unfortunately, however, each of these suggestions has its own flaws and each cannot
establish liability across the entire spectrum of photoshopped images. The bill proposed by the
Georgia state legislators, for example, only applies to obscene photographs and would not cover
photographs that are not obscene but that the subject still finds offensive. Furthermore, the
Hustler standard does not accommodate distortions that are more subtle.
A. False Advertising, Disclaimers, and Photoshop Liability in Other Countries
Along with the four main analogies discussed above, there are also other alternatives that
can make a small contribution to the quest for a workable rubric for photoshop liability. These
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alternatives include classifying photoshopped images as misleading or false advertising, adding
disclaimers beneath photoshopped images, and mirroring the liability standards that England and
France have established.
First, as detailed in the beginning of this Note, photoshopped images in advertisements
could be regulated as “deceptive or misleading advertising.”186 Such images are misleading when
“consumers are unable to distinguish a real image from a manipulated one and . . . consumers are
considering these computer-altered models as a factor when making purchase decisions.”187 In
FTC v. Colgate-Palmolive Co.., the Supreme Court sent a “strong message to advertisers that
deceiving the public would not be tolerated” and found that Colgate’s advertising practices were
a deceptive misrepresentation of its products.188 The Court’s reasoning in Colgate provides
strong support for regulating photoshopped images when they contain misleading qualities.189
The reasonable consumer is generally “unable to determine the difference between a manipulated
image and its original;” therefore, photoshopped images in advertisements can create the same
consumer confusion as misleading advertisements that do not contain photoshopped images.190
Viewed in this light, the courts could establish liability for photoshopped advertisements by
analogizing them to other misleading advertisements that the Supreme Court has previously
allowed agencies to regulate. Unfortunately, this standard would be limited to photoshopping in
advertisements and would not create liability for other photoshopped images.
A second alternative to help establish photoshop liability is for the government to enact
legislation that would require a disclaimer under every photoshopped image. Removing all
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photoshopped imagery would very likely be “viewed as a violation of the First Amendment,” but
designing a warning system similar to the labels on tobacco advertisements “could provide the
ideal compromise for acceptable regulation.”191 In 2006, the University of Alabama conducted a
study in order to determine the best way to place a disclaimer on photoshopped images.192 The
study found that “even though consumers may know about the widely used practice of
photoshopping, without the additional alert immediately prior to or at the same time of viewing
an image, consumers will not process the image as photoshopped and will rather process it as a
real untouched image.”193 The study also found that the disclaimer’s wording needs to be
powerful, the appearance needs to be obvious, and the positioning needs to be “central to the
advertisement.”194 Even with these requirements, this type of disclaimer would not infringe on a
company’s right to advertise and would likely be narrowly tailored enough “to balance the First
Amendment concerns with the need for intervention.”195
Democrats in England have launched a campaign, entitled the “Real Women” campaign,
which seeks to implement this type of disclaimer in the advertising realm.196 Supporters of this
campaign call it a “labeling system” and explain that it would contain an icon “signaling that the
image had been retouched and a rating to accompany the icon that would denote the extent of the
manipulation done to that image.”197 Supporters hope that this rating system will prevent
consumers “from being misled and harmed by images that they may have otherwise perceived as
real” and move companies toward more honest advertising practices.198 In France, a proposed
disclaimer system would impact both advertisements and editorial images and require that these
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photoshopped images carry a warning label.199 This version would cover not only
advertisements, but also “art photography, press releases and political posters, as well as
[images] in magazines.”200 Unlike England’s version, France’s disclaimer would not have further
information rating the extent of the alteration, but violators would be subject to fines.201
Governments in countries such as England and France have looked toward disclaimers in
order to establish a rubric for photoshop liability, but disclaimers would likely not be adequate to
combat the harm that photoshopped images are causing to American society. When viewing
models or celebrities in magazines, young females are often too mesmerized by the fancy clothes
or expensive makeup in the photograph to notice the fine print at the bottom of the page. The
disclaimers would likely go unnoticed by the majority of the population and would therefore do
little to decrease the harms of photoshopped imagery.
B. Combining the Four Analogies with the Two Alternatives for a Workable
Legislative Response
Flaws can be found with each of the four main analogies as well as the two possible
alternative grounds for establishing photoshop liability. Therefore, it is necessary for the
government or the courts to use the reasoning from each of these analogies in order to form a
workable rubric for photoshop liability.
This Note proposes that the best rubric for photoshop liability is a bill that would impose
liability on the creator of a photoshopped image whenever that image could be seen as: (1)
offensive to the reasonable person; or (2) willfully misleading to the reasonable person.
Furthermore, if a public figure or public official wishes to bring a claim under the first prong of
this photoshop liability legislation, he or she must meet the heightened “actual malice” standard
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that was established in New York Times v. Sullivan.202 This bill would combine the reasonable
person standards from the cartoon parody and false light scenarios while still maintaining the
heightened standard for public figures and public officials. In addition, the bill would look at the
level of “offensiveness” rather than obscenity as the Georgia legislation did. This is important
because finding liability for photoshopped images that offend the reasonable person is a broader
and more inclusive standard than simply finding liability for photoshopped images that are
obscene. Furthermore, this bill would include any misleading or deceptive photoshopped images,
whether they are found in advertisements or on social media, but would only impose liability if
the creator’s deception was willful.
If the government were to pass such a bill to regulate photoshop liability, it is highly
probable that the courts would look upon it favorably. It is the court’s job to balance the
government’s need to regulate this area against each individual’s First Amendment guarantees.
This bill appears to perfectly balance these two interests, as it allows the government to regulate
an area that can be harmful to society while still not infringing on a photoshop creator’s ability to
manipulate images as a form of expression. In addition, the bill is broad enough to include more
than just the obscene, but it is also narrowed through its reasonable person and actual malice
standards. The court would likely find that this type of regulation is sufficiently narrowly tailored
to the government’s interest in controlling cyberbullying and decreasing the harmful effects of
manipulated photographs, such as eating disorders and depression. Although it may not be able
to assess liability for the minor enhancements that magazines make to models when such
adjustments are not willfully deceiving, it would still provide a strong legal tool that will likely
cause magazine publishers to think twice about some of the images they portray as real.
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Whether photoshop liability is established with this rubric or with one of the several
others that scholars have proposed, it needs to be established quickly. The problem of photoshop
liability has been acknowledged outside of the legal field by the American Medical Association
(AMA), which adopted a “new policy against the altering of photographs ‘in a manner that could
promote unrealistic expectations of appropriate body image.’”203 In a press release, the AMA
described how “the altering of models’ bodies in advertisements . . . leads to unrealistic ideas
about body image, particularly for ‘impressionable’ children and teenagers.”204 The AMA has
made recommendations to advertising associations that they work with “children’s health
organizations on guidelines that discourage the use of Photoshop and similar photo editing
software.”205 Even though the AMA’s policy against photoshopping does not have the force of
law, it appears to be “a step in the right direction.”206
Part IV: Conclusion
First Amendment principles have been lagging behind advancements in digital
technology over the past decade and we can no longer wait for the marketplace of ideas to rid
society of the harms that photoshopping causes. Digital enhancements through the use of Adobe
Photoshop have allowed publishers to alter images without the consent, and often knowledge, of
the subjects of these images. When the digital alteration is drastic or offensive, these images can
have a very negative impact on their subjects. When the alteration is subtle, these images can
harm the young consumers who cannot tell the difference between a real photograph and an
enhanced one.
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Thanks in large part to the lag between digital advancements and First Amendment
jurisprudence, the victims of photoshopped images have been left without a clear remedy when
such an image is offensive to them and is published in a widely circulated magazine or spread
throughout the internet. Furthermore, young and impressionable girls who are constantly
exposed to photoshopped images of models who appear unrealistically thin have a higher
tendency to develop self-identify issues and eating disorders. Within the past few years,
“consumer attitude has shifted toward opposing this deceptive practice, and therefore, the
environment is ripe to implement regulations to put an end to consumer harm.”207
In order to combat the harms that photoshopping can cause, the government and the
courts must look to reasonable analogies and alternatives in order to form a workable rubric for
photoshop liability. By looking at these analogies and alternatives, the government should create
a rubric which would impose liability whenever a photoshopped image would be offensive to the
reasonable person (with an actual malice standard for public figures and public officials) or
willfully deceiving to the reasonable person. It has become clear throughout the past several
years that photoshopped images are prevalent and harmful, so our government and our courts
should not leave these images without regulation any longer.
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